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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Don’t get brazen with me!” Judge Bruce Schroeder shouted at the
prosecutor as he admonished him for purported misconduct in the high-profile murder trial against Kyle Rittenhouse.2 Our nation’s attention was recently captivated by this case, which involved a seventeen-year-old defendant charged with homicide after he shot and killed two individuals during a
protest against police brutality.3 While the jury eventually acquitted Rittenhouse, the outcome of the case was initially uncertain due to alleged prosecutor misconduct at trial.4 For example, the prosecution reportedly commented on Mr. Rittenhouse’s invocation of his right to remain silent
following his arrest.5 The trial judge subsequently admonished the prosecutor, saying:
I was astonished when you began your examination by commenting on the defendant’s post-arrest silence . . . that’s
basic law. It’s been basic law in this country for 40 years,
50 years. I have no idea why you would do something like
that. You know very well that an attorney can’t go into these
types of areas when the judge has already ruled, without asking outside the presence of the jury to do so.6
The prosecution also attempted to question Rittenhouse about evidence that the judge had previously deemed inadmissible7 and sought to
introduce evidence in contravention of the judge’s earlier ruling excluding
2
See Katherine Fung, Rittenhouse Trial Heats up as Judge Screams at Prosecution: ‘Don’t
Get Brazen With Me’, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/rittenhouse-trialheats-judge-screams-da-dont-get-brazen-me-1648027.
3
See Teo Armus et. al., Before a Fatal Shooting, Teenage Kenosha Suspect Idolized the Police, WASH POST (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/27/kyle-rittenhouse-kenosha-shooting-protests/. Rittenhouse was also accused of shooting, but not killing a
third person. Id.
4
See Maya Yang, Kyle Rittenhouse Lawyers Seek Mistrial as Judge Upbraids Prosecution,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/10/kyle-rittenhouse-trial-kenosha-wisconsin-testimony.
5
See id.
6
See Louis Caslano, Prosecutors Could be Barred from Re-trying Rittenhouse if Prosecutors
Intentionally
Caused
Mistrial:
Expert,
FOX
NEWS
(Nov.
10,
2021),
https://www.foxnews.com/us/rittenhouse-mistrial-expert.
7
See Caitlin Dickson, ‘Don’t Get Brazen with Me!’: Rittenhouse Judge Snaps at Prosecutor
as Defense Requests a Mistrial, YAHOO NEWS (Nov. 10, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/dont-getbrazen-with-me-rittenhouse-judge-snaps-at-prosecutor-as-defense-requests-a-mistrial225840138.html. The prosecution tried to ask Rittenhouse about a video taken weeks before the
shooting in which he said the following about purported shoplifters: “Bro, I wish I had my f***ing
AR. I’d start shooting rounds at them.” Id.
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such evidence.8 In response to the defense attorney’s motion for a mistrial,
the prosecutor claimed to have acted in good faith, to which the judge responded, “When you say you were acting in good faith, I don’t believe that.” 9
If a mistrial with prejudice had been granted based on the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, it would have represented an astonishing outcome in a
case with a great deal of public attention.
As a prosecutor, I have tried murder cases which garnered significant amounts of press coverage and felt tremendous pressure to keep the
community safe and achieve justice. I was acutely aware that every step (and
misstep) I made in court could become the next day’s headline or feature
story on the five o’clock news. The pressure of litigation makes it tempting
to blur ethics lines out of a desire to win—a desire that is natural in an adversarial system.
Litigators are trained to be fierce advocates for their clients in the
courtroom; but when a trial becomes focused on the theatrical performance
of the attorneys, a dangerous line is crossed. One is reminded of the scene
from the musical Chicago, where Billy Flynn, the flamboyant attorney representing accused murderess Roxie Hart, tries to comfort his client prior to
her trial.10 Flynn explains the idea of a trial by saying, “You got nothing to
worry about. It’s all a circus, kid. A three-ring circus. This trial—the world—
all show business. But kid, you’re working with a star, the biggest!”11 Flynn
then sings the catchy song “Razzle Dazzle,” which explains how a trial attorney can distract the jury from the evidence if the lawyer puts on a flashy
show.12 “How can they hear the truth above the roar?” Flynn asks.13
While a Broadway musical may not capture the heart of daily litigation in America, it points to a well-known danger. In its ideal form, “A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for the truth;”14 but this quest
for truth is undermined when the trial shifts its focus from evidence and controlling law and instead centers on emotional appeals to the jury or theatrical
performances by trial counsel. A lawyer who crosses ethical constraints on
trial advocacy may also commit a grave disservice to their client’s interests.

8
See id. The prosecution tried to introduce a photo of Rittenhouse with members of a white
nationalist group. Id.
9
See id.
10
See CHICAGO (Rob Marshall, dir. 2002).
11
See id.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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If a mistrial had been granted in the case of Kyle Rittenhouse, for example,
the state’s interests would be undermined at the hands of its own attorney.15
This article will explore the dangers of trial theatrics at the four primary stages of trial: opening statement, direct examination, cross-examination, and closing argument. It will address the established constitutional and
ethical norms that exist to create guardrails against the derailment of the trial
through theatrics. This article then posits that only strict adherence to these
norms will enable a court to fulfill its role as a facilitator for the quest for the
truth. The trial of Kyle Rittenhouse will be discussed throughout this article
to demonstrate how ethical issues of attorney theatrics arise and are addressed.
This article will begin with a brief overview of the facts that led to
the Rittenhouse trial. Additional information about the case, such as pretrial
motions and objections, will be considered at various points throughout this
piece. The article will then examine the ethics of trial advocacy during each
of the four trial stages and how some of these issues arose in the case against
Mr. Rittenhouse. The section on opening statements will focus on the use of
impermissible rhetoric and argumentation, misuse of the opening statement
to expose the jury to inadmissible evidence, and the improper use of an opening statement to vouch for the credibility of witnesses. The next section examines ethical issues in an attorney’s presentation of their witnesses, as well
as what an attorney must do when their witness lies on the stand, and the
dangers of “coaching” a witness. Next, the article will examine ethical
landmines in the cross-examination of opposing witnesses. This section includes a discussion of cross-examination based on an insufficient foundation, cross-examination that seeks to improperly invade the province of the
jury, and then, specific to criminal law, cross-examination in which a prosecutor improperly comments on a defendant’s invocation of their right to remain silent. The final section of this paper addresses the closing argument.
The section begins with a discussion of the use of improper rhetoric and examines the misuse of moral, religious, and otherwise inflammatory language.
The section closes by noting the ethical and constitutional constraints on
15
See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 (1982) (explaining Double Jeopardy Clause).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant against repeated prosecutions for the same offense. Id. When a mistrial is ordered on the motion of the defendant, when
deciding whether retrial is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the court looks to whether
governmental actions intended to provoke the mistrial request. Id. at 674. “[The Double Jeopardy
Clause] bars retrial where ‘bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor,’ threatens the [h]arassment of
an accused by successive prosecutions or declarations of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution
a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424
U.S. 600, 611 (1976)). “Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’
the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a
second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” Id. at 676.
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attorneys who seek to attack the opposing side, including counsel and their
witnesses. At each of these stages, an attorney’s indulgence in theatrical
presentation can harm the court’s ability to facilitate the quest for the truth.
By moving the focus of the trial away from the performance of trial counsel
and back towards the evidence and controlling law, this danger can be minimized.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CASE OF KYLE RITTENHOUSE
On August 23, 2020, Jacob Blake, a twenty-nine-year-old Black
man, was shot in the back seven times by a white police officer in Kenosha,
Wisconsin.16 Mr. Blake was left partially paralyzed.17 The shooting was
captured by a neighbor through a video which was widely circulated, garnering public outrage.18 The shooting of Mr. Blake was one of many recent
high-profile incidents involving Black individuals harmed or killed during
encounters with the police.19
The shooting was followed by multiple nights of protest involving
hundreds of demonstrators, the deployment of the Wisconsin National
Guard, and the imposition of a curfew.20 Media reports described the destruction of property during these protests, including a furniture store and
downed streetlamps.21
Kyle Rittenhouse, a seventeen-year-old from Illinois whose social
media presence demonstrated a support of law enforcement, came with a
firearm to the scene of the protests.22 While there, Rittenhouse shot and
killed two men, Joseph Rosenbaum and Anthony Huber, and injured a third
man, Gaige Grosskreutz.23 In a video interview conducted shortly before the
shooting, Rittenhouse appeared in front of a boarded-up business and said:

16
See Christina Morales, What We Know About the Shooting of Jacob Bake, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shooting-kenosha.html.
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
See Julie Bosman & Sarah Mervosh, Wisconsin Reels After Police Shooting and Second
Night of Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/us/kenoshapolice-shooting.html.
21
See id.
22
See Haley Willis et. al., Tracking the Suspect in the Kenosha Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
27,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/us/kyle-rittenhouse-kenosha-shootingvideo.html.
23
See Minyvonne Burke, Kyle Rittenhouse, Charged with Killing 2 Kenosha Protestors, Has
Bond Set at $2M, NBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kyle-rittenhouse-charged-killing-2-kenosha-protesters-has-bond-set-n1245953.
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So people are getting injured, and our job is to protect this
business . . . . And part of my job is to also help people. If
there is somebody hurt, I’m running into harm’s way. That’s
why I have my rifle—because I can protect myself obviously. But I also have my med kit.24

Videos posted to social media showed shots ringing out in a car lot
before a man was discovered with a gunshot wound to the head.25 Rittenhouse was heard saying, “I just killed somebody” as he jogged away from
the scene.
Rittenhouse was ultimately charged with seven offenses: first-degree homicide, use of a dangerous weapon; first-degree recklessly endangering safety, use of a weapon; first-degree intentional homicide, use of a dangerous weapon; attempted first-degree intentional homicide, use of a
dangerous weapon; first-degree recklessly endangering safety, use of a dangerous weapon; possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18; and
a curfew violation.26 The curfew violation and underage possession of a firearm charges were dropped by the judge during the course of the trial and
were not considered by the jury.27 As to the other charges, Rittenhouse
claimed that he acted in self-defense.28
III. OPENING STATEMENT
An attorney’s opening statement sets the tone for a trial and is the
first meaningful opportunity to preview the case for the jury.29 Naturally,
both sides want to maximize the impact of their opening statements on the
decision maker’s disposition towards the case. This desire gives rise to three
specific temptations which may present ethical problems in the court room.
The first of these is the use of improper rhetoric—in other words, the use of
an impermissible argument or inflammatory language. The second is the
24
See NBC Chi., Who is Kyle Rittenhouse? What We Know About the 17-Year-Old Arrested
in Kenosha Shooting, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/whois-kyle-rittenhouse-what-we-know-about-the-17-year-old-arrested-in-kenosha-shooting/2329610/.
25
See id.
26
See Clare Hymes, Everything We Know About the Kyle Rittenhouse Trial, CBS NEWS (Nov.
16, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kyle-rittenhouse-trial-timeline/.
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See Allison Leotta, 6 More Leading Trial Lawyers Share Secrets of Effective Opening Statements, A.B.A J. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/trial_lawyers_best_opening_statements (“Many of us heard this advice for the first time from our mothers:
‘You don’t have a second chance to make a first impression.’ Opening statements are likely the
first time (except for the rare attorney voir dire) a jury will hear a client’s story and your voice.”)
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misuse of the opening statement to expose the jury to inadmissible evidence.
Since claims made in opening statements are not vetted through the rules of
evidence or by objections from opposing counsel, an attorney may be
tempted to “poison the well” by introducing the jury to prejudicial information that would be inadmissible at trial, or by referencing facts that cannot
be supported through admissible testimony. The final temptation involves
vouching for the credibility of witnesses or asserting a personal opinion
about the case. Each temptation highlights the overall danger of which this
article warns—when the theatrical nature of litigation runs rampant, the
court’s quest for the truth is threatened. It is only through the rigorous enforcement of ethical and constitutional norms that this danger be avoided.
A.

Impermissible Rhetoric and Argumentation

While impermissible rhetoric is addressed later in this article, it is
important to consider the issue when discussing opening statements. It is
easy to dismiss some misplaced trial rhetoric as “a few injudicious words”
uttered in the heat of battle;30 but this argument falls flat for opening statements because the battle “has yet to be joined” and such statements are prepared in advance with deliberation and thought.31 Rhetoric in an opening
statement crosses the line of permissibility when it is not a summary overview of the evidence, but rather commentary, and thus argument, on the evidence itself. The proper time and place for commentary on evidence is during summation in the closing argument, where an attorney is permitted to
focus the jury’s attention on the trial evidence and the inferences to be drawn
therefore.”32
Neither should an opening statement contain “unnecessary, overly
dramatic characterizations.”33 An example of an overly dramatic characterization is a statement that a defendant in a tax evasion case “could not have
done a more effective job of getting money . . . if he had went out and bought
a mask, got an acetylene torch . . . and blown the vault door open.”34 This
type of assertion could be viewed as an attempt to prejudice the jury against
the other side by destroying their credibility.35

30

See United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 469 (3d Cir. 1977).
See id.
32
See id. at 470 (internal citations omitted).
33
See id. (citing United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 738 (3d Cir. 1974)).
34
See United States v. Singer, 482 F.2d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1973).
35
See id. at 398-99 (first citing Government of Virginia Islands v. Turner, 409 F.2d 102, 103
(1st Cir. 1969); and then citing Leonard v. United States, 277 F.2d 834, 841-42 (9th Cir. 1960)).
31

GIVE 'EM THE OL' RAZZLE DAZZLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

212

7/11/22 9:23 AM

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXVII

This leads to the natural question— what is an argument that would
render an opening statement problematic? One author, finding case law and
trial advocacy law books insufficient in answering this question, interviewed
experienced litigators in the field and constructed guidance for determining
when an opening statement becomes argumentative.36 To avoid becoming
argumentative, a litigator should: (1) use only facts that will clearly be
deemed admissible; (2) avoid all reference to matters beyond the case at
hand; (3) refrain from attacking the opponent’s motive or integrity; (4) leave
it to closing to address why their side is correct; and (5) avoid vouching for
their side’s witnesses and overtly attacking their opponent’s.37
B.

Misuse of the Opening Statement to Expose the Jury to Inadmissible
Evidence

In its ideal form, the opening statement is an objective summary of
the evidence reasonably expected to be produced; it should not be used as an
opportunity to “poison the jury’s mind” against the other side or “to recite
items of highly questionable evidence.”38 Courts recognize that attorneys
may be tempted “to capitalize on evidence which [is] inadmissible because
of a technicality.”39 In other words, a litigant who is prohibited from presenting a pertinent fact due to a legitimate evidentiary objection might wish
to reference this fact in an opening statement, hoping that it seeps into the
subconscious of the jury. Trying to “side-step” the rules of evidence in this
way undermines the purpose of the rules, which is to “administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”40
When a prosecutor acts in bad faith by making a claim in an opening
statement that is not supported by admissible evidence, it may result in a
mistrial.41 In federal civil cases, the test for determining whether improper

36
See Jules M. Epstein, Opening Statement v. Argument—Where is the Line, TEMP. UNIV.
BEASLEY SCH. OF L.: ADVOC. & EVIDENCE BLOG, https://www2.law.temple.edu/aer/openingstatement-v-argument-where-is-the-line/ (last visited May. 12, 2022).
37
See id.
38
See United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872, 874 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States
v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 1977)) (identifying a prosecutor’s comment in opening as
improper, but not to the point of warranting reversal, that a picture of the defendant with heavy
gold jewelry was the kind of item specifically worn by drug dealers).
39
See United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107, 110 (10th Cir. 1990).
40
See FED. R. EVID. 102.
41
See e.g., Novak, 918 F.2d at 109-10 (analyzing whether a “prosecutor’s failure to introduce
facts a trial supporting statements made during opening argument should result in a mistrial). When
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remarks by counsel should result in a new trial is found in Ventura v. Kyle.42
This test focuses on whether (1) the remarks were minor aberrations made in
passing; (2) whether the court took specific curative action; and (3) whether
the size of the damage award suggests that that the improper comments had
a prejudicial effect.43 While Ventura addressed improper comments during
closing, the principle at issue is the same—when an attorney makes statements that put inadmissible evidence before the jury, it is ethically impermissible and jeopardizes their client’s case.
The facts of the Ventura case provide an example of impermissible
comments that may prejudice the jury. This case involved a defamation claim
asserted by the colorful former Governor of Minnesota and professional
wrestler, Jesse Ventura, against an author who wrote a book about Ventura.44
Counsel for the plaintiff, relying solely on witnesses’ denial of knowledge
regarding whether the publisher was insured, argued that the witnesses were
biased because it was, “hard to believe they didn’t know about the insurance
policy[.]”45 In its opinion, the court noted that it would be difficult to view
this comment as anything other than a deliberate and strategic choice to influence damages by referencing an impersonal deep-pocket insurer—a fact
which was both inadmissible if true, and not proven in any event.46 Noting
that it is repugnant to a fair trial for a jury to allow the plaintiff to recover
under these circumstances, the court reversed the verdict.47
Practical problems also arise when an attorney references testimony
in an opening statement that is never introduced at trial. In Ouber v. Guarino, the First Circuit considered this issue when reviewing an inmate’s habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.48 During the
opening statement, counsel for the defense promised four times that the defendant would testify, emphasizing the importance of this testimony in ascertaining whether she knew that envelopes she had delivered contained cocaine.49 The defense ultimately elected not to call the defendant to the stand
and the defendant was convicted.50 When determining whether the verdict
should be overturned, the court first considered the defense attorney’s
considering this issue the court looks to whether the prosecutor acted in good faith and the impact
the statements had on the trial. See id. at 109.
42
825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2015).
43
See Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 885 (8th Cir. 2015).
44
See id. at 878-82.
45
See id. at 881.
46
See id. at 885.
47
See Ventura, 825 F.3d at 886 (citing Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 100, 112 (8th Cir.
1967)).
48
See Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 2002)
49
See id. at 22.
50
See id. at 23.
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conduct during trial.51 The court reasoned that the decision to present the
defendant’s testimony as the centerpiece of the defense, and then to subsequently advise his client against testifying, could not be seen as part of reasoned trial strategy and thus constituted an error in professional judgment.52
However, the court noted that only the most inexcusable misstep by trial
counsel would lead to a finding that performance was so deficient that the
defendant did not have adequate representation.53 The court ultimately concluded that, “counsel committed an obvious error, without any semblance of
a colorable excuse.”54 When examining whether counsel’s misstep prejudiced the case, the court noted that the jury was deadlocked before eventually
reaching the verdict.55 Given how close the case was, the error, while arguably small, was rather monumental.56 Accordingly, the verdict was set aside
because of this deficiency.57 Promising a jury certain testimony and then not
presenting it can lead the jury to question the integrity of one side or to assume that testimony would have been damaging.58 Ouber highlights how a
broken promise made in opening can be detrimental to a client’s case.
It is important to note that discussing otherwise inadmissible evidence in opening allows the opposing party to admit evidence on the same
subject.59 For example, referencing an inadmissible out-of-court statement
of a witness may allow the opposing side to introduce the statement or testimony about it.60 Similarly, calling a witness a liar in opening statement may
justify the introduction of testimony that bolsters that witness’s credibility.61
It is clearly established in case law that a lawyer cannot use the opening statement as an opportunity to present evidence that will not later be admitted. This rule is also codified in the Rules of Professional Conduct, which
states that a lawyer at trial shall not “allude to any matter the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will be supported by admissible

51

See id. at 25 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
See Ouber, 293 F.3d at 27.
53
See id. at 27.
54
See id. at 32.
55
See id. at 33.
56
See id.
57
See Ouber, 293 F.3d at 35.
58
See United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (“A defendant’s
opening statement prepares the jury to hear his case. If the defense fails to produce promised expert
testimony that is critical to the defense strategy, a danger arises that the jury will presume the expert
is unwilling to testify and the defense is flawed.”)
59
See United States v. Chavez, 229 F.3d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 2000).
60
See id.
61
See United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1995)).
52

GIVE 'EM THE OL' RAZZLE DAZZLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

7/11/22 9:23 AM

Give ‘Em the Ol’ Razzle Dazzle

215

evidence[.]”62 To prevent the misuse of an opening statement by opposing
counsel, litigators may file a motion in limine.63
Attorneys frequently find themselves in situations where the
opposing counsel persistently solicits prejudicial evidence
which, although logically relevant, is not legally relevant.
When this situation arises, the attorney is faced with the dilemma of either continually objecting to the evidence,
thereby arousing the suspicions of the jury and creating additional prejudice, or not objecting to the evidence, thereby
waiving the right to raise the issue in a motion for a new trial
or on appeal. To avoid facing this double-edged sword,
many experienced trial attorneys employ a relatively new
procedural device: the motion in limine.64
In addition to preventing the opposing side from introducing prejudicial testimony, a successfully argued motion in limine precludes the opposing side from referencing the evidence in their opening statement.65
This tactic was used successfully by Kyle Rittenhouse’s attorneys
when they moved to exclude evidence of a video taken prior to the shooting,
where Mr. Rittenhouse made statements intimating a predisposition for violence.66 The defense also filed a motion seeking to prevent the prosecution
from introducing evidence that the defendant was affiliated with the group
known as the Proud Boys.67 The prosecutor wanted to argue that

62

See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
63
See In limine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (stating motion in limine is one
that is raised prior to trial “because of an issue about the admissibility of evidence believed by the
movant to be prejudicial”).
64
See Johnny K. Richardson, Use of Motions in Limine in Civil Proceedings, 45 MO. L. REV.
130, 130 (1980).
65
See United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107, 109 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining counsel may
generally refer to evidence in their opening statement which they reasonably expect to be introduced). Consider a situation where there is prejudicial evidence at issue and the parties have not
litigated the admissibility of that evidence through a motion in limine. The proponent of the evidence is theoretically justified in referencing the testimony in the opening statement, assuming they
have a reasonable belief that the evidence will be admitted. If that belief is incorrect and the testimony is later excluded, the minds of the jury may be poisoned by hearing about the evidence, even
though it was never actually admitted at trial. Successfully precluding references to the evidence
in the motion in limine can protect against this harm.
66
See discussion infra Section V, Subsection A. This motion will be discussed in-depth later
in this article in the portion discussing cross-examination without foundation.
67
See Todd Richmond, Judge: Prosecutor’s Can’t Show Rittenhouse Link to Proud Boys, AP
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/wisconsin-police-trials-gun-politics-kenosha8cd887f731ace320bf945f9524ceb252.
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Rittenhouse, who had been seen at a bar with members of this white nationalist group, shared in its “white supremacist philosophies and violent tactics.”68 The defense argued that the racial overtones of the original protests
notwithstanding, there was insufficient evidence connecting him to the
Proud Boys and no evidence that the shootings were racially motivated, as
the men he shot at were white.69 The judge agreed with the defense and
excluded the testimony.70 Had this motion not been successfully raised by
the defense, the prosecution could have referenced these facts in its opening
statement, implying to the jury that the defendant was associated with a
group most people detest.
C.

Vouching for Witnesses or Asserting Personal Opinions

The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from “asserting personal knowledge of facts in issue” or stating “a personal opinion as to
the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil
litigant or the guilt or innocence of the accused.”71 Behavior which violates
this norm can take two related forms. The first is “vouching”72 for a witness—in other words, stating a personal opinion as to the credibility of a
witness. The second is stating a personal opinion about the case more
broadly. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that these admonitions
are not restricted to the opening statement alone and apply throughout the
trial. Thus, the problems associated with engaging in this type of conduct
can occur in the opening statement as well as the closing argument.
When an attorney inserts their personal knowledge and views into
the case, they lend their own credibility to the witnesses and evidence, potentially distracting and swaying the jury. The danger of this is even greater
when the vouching is done by a prosecutor, as a prosecutor’s opinion, “carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to
trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.”73
When an attorney states a personal opinion, they can also convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the attorney,

68

See id.
See id.
70
See id.
71
See MODEL RULES r. 3.4.
72
See United States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (declaring lawyers may not “vouch for a witness by offering their personal opinion of a witness’s testimony or
suggesting that information exists outside the record that verifies the witness’s truthfulness”).
73
See id. (quoting United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009)).
69
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supports that attorney’s side, thus creating the risk that the case will not be
tried solely on the basis of evidence presented in court.74
The Supreme Court case of Berger v. United States highlights the
danger of an attorney who uses trial theatrics to turn the attention of the jury
from the evidence.75 In Berger, the defendant’s conviction was overturned
because the federal prosecutor had, “overstepped the bounds of propriety and
fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer[.]”76 Specifically, the Court took issue with the attorney’s misstating facts during
cross examination; “putting words” into the mouths of witnesses; referring
to statements that had been made to him out of court without proof; pretending to understand a witness as saying something other than what they had
said; assuming prejudicial facts not in evidence; bullying and arguing with
witnesses; and “in general . . . conducting himself in a thoroughly indecorous
and improper manner.”77 The Court found the attorney’s presentation of the
case “undignified and intemperate” because it contained improper insinuations and assertions that were calculated to mislead the jury.78 The opinion
further criticized the prosecutor’s failed attempts to lead a witness who had
trouble identifying the defendant, saying, “I was examining a women that I
knew knew [the defendant] and could identify him, she was standing right
here looking at him, and I couldn’t say, ‘Isn’t that the man?’ Now imagine
that! But that is the rules of the game, and I have to play within those rules.”79
The Court noted that this insinuation invited the jury to conclude that the
witness knew the defendant and that this was within the personal knowledge
of the attorney. Because assertions of personal knowledge by an attorney
are apt to carry weight with the jury, an attorney cannot express a personal
opinion about a witness’s credibility, guarantee their truthfulness, or imply
that the attorney knows something the jury does not.80
Admittedly, determining what constitutes impermissible vouching is
often difficult. Generally, vouching occurs when an attorney asserts their
74

See Young v. United States, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985).
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935).
76
See id. at 79, 84.
77
See id. at 84.
78
See id. at 85.
79
See Berger, 295 U.S. at 87.
80
See id. at 88; see also United States v. Roundtree, 534 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
United States v. Benitez–Meraz, 161 F.3d 1163, 1167 (8th Cir.1998)). “Improper vouching may
occur when the government expresses a personal opinion about credibility, implies a guarantee of
truthfulness, or implies it knows something the jury does not.’” Id.; United States v. Jones, 468
F.3d 704, 707 (10th Cir. 2006)). “It is a due process error for a prosecutor to indicate ‘a personal
belief in the witness’ credibility, either through explicit personal assurances of the witness’ veracity
or by implicitly indicating that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’ testimony.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1498 (10th Cir.1990)).
75
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own viewpoint as to the credibility of a witness rather than drawing an appropriate inference from the evidence.81 Such a practice is impermissible
because it introduces “credibility evidence that would have been inadmissible during trial.”82 Vouching and commentary is obvious when, for example,
the attorney makes statements such as “I believe [Witness X] was credible”
or “I don’t think [Witness Y] was truthful up here on the stand[.]”83 Assertions that a witness was telling the truth or lying crosses the same line.84
Implying that a witness would not have lied because of the ramifications of
committing perjury poses similar issues, as it suggests that the attorney
knows something about the consequences of lying that the jury does not.85
An attorney’s discussion of a witness’s motivation for testifying or the safeguards established to ensure that a witness does not lie, however, do not constitute impermissible vouching.86 This could include referring to a witness
as “meticulous,” as long as the attorney reviews the witness’s testimony in
context and does not otherwise personally endorse such testimony.87
Interestingly, it was the judge the Rittenhouse case, and not the attorneys, who vouched for a witness.88 On Veteran’s Day, the judge asked if
there were any veterans on the jury or elsewhere in the courtroom.89 He then
noted that the defendant’s next witness, John Black, was a veteran and encouraged everyone to, “give a round of applause to the people who have
served our country.”90 Legal experts noted that this may have encouraged
jurors to view the witness more favorably.91 This highlights the particular
dangers of vouching—rather than leaving the issue of the credibility to the
81
See United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing two interpretations of prosecutor’s statement). In Andreas, the prosecutor stated that the case against the
defendant was “one of the most compelling and powerful that has ever been presented in an American courtroom.” Id. The court noted that this comment could be interpretated as either a remark
on the strength of the evidence or as the prosecutor expressing a personal opinion about the strength
of the evidence. Id.
82
See id. at 671.
83
See United States v. Green, 119 Fed. Appx. 133, 134 (9th Cir. 2004) (overturning a defendant’s convictions because of impermissible vouching by the prosecutor).
84
See United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005).
85
See id. at 1146 (citing United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 574-76 (9th Cir. 2004)).
86
See Bass v. United States, 655 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Although attempts to bolster
a witness by vouching for his credibility are normally improper, the government may explain why
the jury might find the government’s witnesses credible” (citing United States v. Roundtree, 534
F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2008))).
87
See id.
88
See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, In Scrutinized Kyle Rittenhouse Trial, It’s the Judge Commanding Attention, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/11/us/kylerittenhouse-judge-bruce-schroeder.html
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
See id.
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jury, one of the trial “actors” linked his own credibility to a witness, potentially skewing the jury’s analysis of the witness’s testimony.
IV. DIRECT EXAMINATIONS
When an attorney determines which witnesses to call to the stand
and what questions to ask, they are writing the script that the jury will hear
during trial. While a skilled attorney seeks to narrate a compelling story to
maintain the jury’s attention, too much drama may detract from the truth.
When calling witnesses to the stand and examining them, there are two major
ethical issues that may arise. The first involves an attorney’s duty of candor
to the court, including what the lawyer must do when their witness tells a lie
from the stand. The second concerns “coaching” and how an attorney should
properly prepare a witness for testifying.
A.

Candor to the Court

When I teach ethics to newer prosecutors, I ask what they must do
when their witness lies on the stand. They often respond that they should
tell the defense attorney. While this is a good instinct, it is an insufficient
response because it only satisfies an attorney’s ethical obligations to opposing counsel, not to the court. The Rules of Professional Conduct outline
three strict rules involving an attorney’s candor to the court: (1) a lawyer
must not make a false statement of fact or law to the court and must correct
one previously made; (2) a lawyer must disclose controlling legal authority
adverse to their position that is not disclosed by the other side; and (3) a
lawyer must not offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.92 With
respect to the last of these, the rules further note that if the lawyer learns of
false testimony by their client or witness, they shall “take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”93 Recognizing that false testimony might come from an attorney’s client and that
disclosing the falsity could result in serious ramifications to the client, the
official comments to the rule suggest a sequential three-part method for addressing a client’s false testimony.94 First, the attorney should seek the client’s cooperation in withdrawing or correcting the false statement.95 If that
fails, the attorney should seek to withdraw from representing the client.96 If
92
93
94
95
96

See MODEL RULES r. 3.3.
See id.
See id. at cmt 10.
See id.
See MODEL RULES r. 3.3
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withdrawal is either not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false
testimony, then the attorney must disclose the false testimony “as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation,” even if it requires disclosure of privileged attorney-client communication.97
The duty to correct a witness’s or client’s misrepresentation is ongoing and may continue beyond the immediate proceeding.98 Moreover, failing to uphold the duty of candor to the court may subject the attorney to
serious consequences, such as suspension. “[S]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being
submitted to the court or that the material information is improperly being
withheld, and takes no remedial action . . . .”99 The attorney violating this
norm may also be financially sanctioned and forced to pay attorney’s fees
for the other side.100 In one case, the Fourth Circuit offered blistering commentary regarding a prosecutor’s violations of the duty of candor.101 The
court wrote:
Make no mistake, however. We may find such practices
‘harmless’ as to a specific defendant’s verdict, but as to litigants in the Eastern District of North Carolina and our justice system at large, they are anything but harmless. No one
in this county is so high that she or he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law in defiance with impunity.
All the officers of the government, from the highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. The
law of this country promises defendants due process, and the
professional code to which attorneys are subject mandates
candor to the court, and fairness to opposing parties. Yet the
United States Attorney’s office in this district seems unfazed by the fact that the discovery abuses violate constitutional guarantees and misrepresentations erode faith that
justice is achievable. Something must be done.102

97

See id.
See United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1993).
99
See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAW. SANCTIONS § 6.12 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended
1992)).
100
See Six v. Generations Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508, 510 (4th Cir. 2018) (upholding
sanctions against an attorney who challenged the authenticity of a loan agreement for two years
before revealing that they possessed an identical copy, obtained from their client, before filing the
complaint).
101
See United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327, 342 (4th Cir. 2013).
102
See id. at 342 (internal citation omitted).
98
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The court then urged the district court to meet with the prosecutor’s
office to develop remedial procedures to correct these issues and directed the
Clerk of Court to serve its opinion on the United States Attorney General
and the Office of Professional Responsibility for the Department of Justice
with a transmittal letter that “should call attention to this section of the opinion.”103
It is important to understand the rule requiring candor to the tribunal
as part of a larger objective of preserving the integrity of the judicial system—it is not enough that the lawyer merely refrain from making affirmative
misstatements.104 For example, if, after filing pleadings based on the representations of a witness, an attorney later discovers that there are serious questions about that individual’s credibility and allows the case to proceed unabated, that attorney has violated their duty of candor to the court.105 In other
words, an attorney cannot “shelter” themselves behind an argument that they
do not have “actual knowledge” that a witness lied when they have a substantial reason to believe that is the case.106 An attorney who, upon discovering issues undermining their witnesses’ testimony, responds by failing to
reveal it, obstructing the other side’s ability to discover it, or continuing as
if nothing has happened, can be rightfully sanctioned.107 Upholding one’s
duty of candor to the court ensures that the trial avoids theatrics and focuses
on the law and evidence. In a trial, the role of the witness in a proper proceeding is to speak the truth, not to simply provide the lines that will help its
favored side prevail. It is the attorney’s ethical duty to ensure that the witness’ testimony is honest and not misleading.
B.

Witness Coaching

While litigators are permitted to meet with their witnesses before
trial and prepare for their testimony, there is a point where such preparation
becomes coaching108 “Coaching” is understood as an attorney’s improper
directing of a witness’s testimony as to “have it conform with, conflict with,
or supplement the testimony of other witnesses.”109 This may occur in a
pretrial setting or during the witness’s actual testimony. Where an attorney
103

See id.
See United States v. Shaeffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1993).
105
See id. at 459.
106
See id.
107
See id. at 461.
108
See Banks v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 295, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Nambo-Barajas, 338 F.3d 956, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2003).
109
See Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1003, 1110 (11th Cir. 1986) (overturned on other
grounds United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2015)).
104
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has “inappropriately ‘coached’ a witness, thorough cross-examination of that
witness violates no privilege and is entirely appropriate to address the issue
[of coaching].”110 If done correctly, such cross-examination can determine
the extent of the coaching and develop a sufficient record that can be used to
question the witness’s credibility. 111 But while cross-examination plays an
important role in preventing coaching, it is not a complete answer. The availability of a sequestration order under rules of evidence demonstrates “that
cross-examination may not be wholly sufficient to safeguard the truth-finding function in all circumstances.”112
It should also be noted that an attorney’s actions while engaging the
witness on the stand may constitute coaching. “Head-nodding and eye
movements . . . theoretically can cross the line and constitute improper
vouching.”113 While nodding as a witness speaks may be unintentional, it
has the potential to enter into the realm of coaching when it becomes “unprofessional and inappropriate.”114 Conduct such as providing a highlighted
transcript to a witness with suggested language similarly constitutes coaching.115
The Fifth Circuit has suggested that, to prepare witnesses without
coaching, an attorney should allow the witness to provide their version of
what occurred without suggestion and then “probe, test, and further explore
any portions of that version that may be inconsistent with the witness’[s]
earlier statements, or other expected evidence.”116 Coaching occurs when
the witness is pressured or pushed into changing their story, such that coercion has occurred.117
Impermissible coaching may affect the adjudication of the case at
bar. Attorneys who are notorious for such conduct could have civil verdicts

110
See United States v. Rhynes, 196 F.3d 207, 247 (4th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Mitola, 213 Fed. Appx. 579, 579 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89
(1976)); United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
111
See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1976).
112
See United States v. Rhynes, 206 F.3d 349, 369 (4th Cir. 1999); see also FED. R. EVID. 615.
Under the Rules of Evidence, the court upon motion of the parties must exclude witnesses from a
courtroom (with limited exceptions), so that they cannot hear other witness testimony. Id. “The
purpose of sequestration is to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to that of prior witnesses and to aid in detection of dishonesty.” United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 681 (8th Cir.
2003) (citing United States v. Vallie, 284 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 2002)).
113
See United States v. Sepulveda-Hernandez, 752 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United
States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1039 (6th Cir. 1996)); United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563
(5th Cir. 1994).
114
See United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 47 (1st Cir. 2005).
115
See e.g., Ibarra v. Baker, 338 Fed. Appx. 457, 467-68 (5th Cir. 2009)
116
See Banks v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 295, 325 (5th Cir. 2009).
117
See id. at 325-26.
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overturned118 and can be denied pro hac vice status.119 Improper coaching
of a witness by a prosecutor may result in the declaration of a mistrial with
a bar on retrying the defendant,120 and coaching in a deposition could lead to
dismissal of a complaint with prejudice.121 Coaching carries disciplinary
consequences as well, and may result in an attorney being found in contempt.122 Even a mere suspicion of coaching may result in a strong admonition from the court, which may state, for example, “we caution that coaching
witnesses to offer false testimony would be a serious violation of professional standards and could amount to criminal conduct.”123
Like the other dangers noted in this article, coaching has a theatrical
component to it. A coached witness is like an actor who memorizes their
lines so that the production goes as planned, and when an attorney indulges
the theatrical nature of the trial, they risk overshadowing the truth. Embedded in prohibitions against coaching is the concern that an overly prepared
witness will not speak the unvarnished truth, but simply parrot what the attorney has told them to say in the manner they were told to say it.124 By

118

See Spruill v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 93-4706, 1995 U.S. Dist. WL 534273, at *1
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
119
See Jacob v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 63 Fed. Appx. 610, 612 (3d Cir. 2003). Pro hac
vice refers to a lawyer who has not been admitted to practice in a particular jurisdiction but is
admitted temporarily for the purpose of conducting a particular case. Pro hac vice, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
120
See Lovinger v. Cir. Ct. of 19th Jud. Cir., 845 F.2d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1988).
121
See Friends of Animals v. United State Surgical Corp., 131 F.3d 332, 333 (2d Cir. 1997).
122
See Benson v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1973)
(declining to overturn contempt finding after defense counsel ignored trial judge’s warnings against
coaching witness).
123
See Victor v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., 708 Fed. Appx. 333, 334 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017).
124
See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 (1989). The manner in which truth can be compromised by over-preparation between a witness and an attorney is highlighted by the following quote
from the Supreme Court:
Cross-examination often depends for its effectiveness on the ability of counsel to punch
holes in a witness’ testimony at just the right time, in just the right way. Permitting a
witness, including a criminal defendant, to consult without counsel after direct examination but before cross-examination grants the witness an opportunity to regroup and regain a poise and sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not possess. This is
true even if we assume no deceit on the part of the witness; it is simply an empirical
predicate of our system of adversary rather than inquisitorial justice that cross-examination of a witness who is uncounseled between direct examination and cross-examination
is more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-examination of a witness
who is given time to pause and consult with the attorney. ‘Once the defendant places
himself at the very heart of the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that the
story presented on direct is measured for its accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced
testimony on cross-examination.’
Id. at 282-83 (quoting United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 151 (2nd Cir. 1981)).
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adhering to ethical rules against coaching and refusing to fuel this theatrical
style of trial, the attorney can focus the proceeding on the evidence and the
law, in a quest for the discovery of truth.
V. CROSS-EXAMINATION
In the legal classic, The Art of Cross-Examination, author Francis
Wellman emphasized the importance of cross-examination and its impact on
the outcome of a case:125 “The issue of a cause rarely depends upon speech
and is but seldom even affected by it. But there is never a cause contested,
the result of which is not mainly dependent upon the skill with which the
advocate conducts his cross-examination.”126 The United States Supreme
Court has similarly recognized cross-examination as, “the greatest engine
ever invented for the discovery of the truth.”127 Cross-examination has an
outsized role in adjudication and is generally idealized (perhaps unfairly) as
the most effective means for exposing deception and error.128
The act of cross-examination is often an unequal battle of skill between a trained attorney and a potentially inexperienced witness. With crossexamination having such a central role in the litigation process, attorneys
may take advantage of this disparate skill level to secure a decisive win for
their client. When attorneys succumb to this temptation, cross-examination
is not used as a mechanism for sifting out the truth, but rather as a tool for
presenting a slanted version of reality in the hopes of benefiting one side.
The ethical and constitutional constraints on cross-examination are
divided into three general classes of rules. The first class ensures that crossexamination is based on an appropriate foundation and is not used to put
otherwise inadmissible testimony before the jury. The second set of rules
focuses on restraining a litigator’s use of cross-examination in a way that
invades the province of the jury in determining credibility and ultimate issues
of fact.129 The third class, specific to criminal law and of significant import
125

See FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 21 (4th ed. 1997).
See id.
127
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Lilly v. Va., 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999);
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
128
See United States v. Leibowitz, 919 F.2d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Posner wrote of
cross-examination that it might be “the only resource of the defendant in unmasking the falsity” of
testimony against him, but that cross-examination, “much mythology to the contrary notwithstanding—is not an infallible lie detector.” Id.
129
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions.”); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 388 (1913) (“[I]t is the province of
the jury to hear the evidence and by their verdict to settle the issues of fact, no matter what the state
of the evidence.”)
126
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in the Rittenhouse case, prohibits a prosecutor from asking about a defendant’s assertion of his right under Miranda to remain silent following his arrest.
A.

Cross Without Foundation

A trial lawyer may not, “allude to any matter that the lawyer does
not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence[.]”130 Rules governing the admissibility of evidence can frustrate
a litigator as they may keep information from a jury that would benefit their
client. 131 Attorneys are often tempted to circumvent these evidentiary hurdles through cross-examination of a witness, and courts must constrain such
questioning to ensure that the rules of evidence are not undermined.132
United States v. Cunningham highlights the damage that results
when these rules are not sufficiently policed. In that case, a defendant was
cross-examined by a prosecutor who referenced government intelligence reports that were never introduced into evidence.133 Through this line of questioning, the government implied that the defendant was involved in drug
dealing without producing witnesses with first-hand knowledge of this assertion—witnesses whose testimony could be challenged by the defendant.134 The Sixth Circuit noted that the cross-examination of the defendant
“was almost entirely based upon hearsay, suspicion, unverified sources and
unreliable innuendo.”135

130

See MODEL RULES r. 3.4(e)
See FED. R. EVID. 403. Rules of evidence for example require that the probative value of
evidence be weighed against its prejudicial effect with the intent of excluding evidence which might
be relevant if it risks the danger of unfair prejudice or has a likelihood of confusing the trier of fact.
Id.; Sprint v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008).
132
By way of example, though it occurred in direct examination rather than cross-examination.
Several years ago, I saw a defense attorney accomplish this quite skillfully. His client claimed an
alibi against the charges by asserting that at the time of the offense he had travelled to a different
state. Rather than proceeding with the laborious, expensive, and often unsuccessful task of subpoenaing out-of-state witnesses to back the alibi testimony, the attorney asked his client, “what was
the first thing you did when you arrived in New Jersey (the other state)?” The defendant responded
he had used an ATM. The attorney asked him if he remembered the precise time he had used the
ATM and the defendant responded that he did not. The attorney then refreshed his recollection
using an ATM receipt, which is permissible. FED. R. EVID. 612. The judge ultimately credited the
alibi, citing to how well corroborated it had been, but it had never actually been corroborated. After
all, the receipt itself was not in evidence. However, this litigation “trick,” created the impression
for the judge that independent evidence supported the defendant’s testimony.
133
See United States v. Cunningham, 529 F.2d 884, 885 (6th Cir. 1976).
134
See id.
135
Id. at 887.
131
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Similarly, in United States v. Crawford, a prosecutor insinuated that
a defendant associated with convicted drug users and dealers by asking him
if he knew particular individuals.136 Here, the court opined that the defendant
had not placed his general character in issue and it was therefore inappropriate to throw, “a shroud of suspicion over [him] and his knowledge of the
drug traffic.”137 The court also noted that cross-examination is improper and
unfair when it is intended to do nothing but degrade the other party and prejudice the jury against him.138
The Seventh Circuit has outlined other examples of impermissible
attempts to shortcut laying appropriate evidentiary foundation.139 For instance, the court has stated that it is improper for a lawyer to “ask a question
which implies a factual predicate which the examiner knows he cannot support by evidence or for which he has no reason to believe that there is a
foundation of truth.”140 Examples include asking a witness about prior inconsistent statements without being prepared to call the person to whom the
inconsistent statement was made141 and asking a witness about prior convictions without having a certified record of conviction in the event of a denial.142 It should be noted, however, that a lawyer does not always have a
universal duty to introduce the factual predicate for a question and the court
may rest its analysis on the good-faith of the questioner.143
It is also inappropriate for an attorney to introduce wholly inadmissible testimony during cross-examination. In United States v. Sanchez, for
example, a prosecutor wanted to show that the defendant’s wife, who could
not be called to the stand due to marital privilege,144 had told an investigator
facts that contradicted the defendant’s testimony on the stand.145 The
136

See United States v. Crawford, 438 V.2d 441, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1971).
See id. at 444-45.
138
See id. at 445 (quoting Salerno v. United States, 61 F.2d 419, 424 (8th Cir. 1932)).
139
See United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1307 (7th Cir. 1976).
140
Id.
141
See United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 73-74 (7th Cir. 1971).
142
See State v. Williams, 210 N.W.2d 21, 25-26 (Minn. 1973) (finding prosecutor questioning
defendant about prior crimes for which ‘rap sheet’ did not provide factual basis was improper and
prejudicial); cf. Ciravolo v. United States, 384 F.2d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding prosecutor questioned defendant about prior felony, which in reality was a misdemeanor was prejudicial).
143
See Harris, 532 F.2d at 1307-08.
144
See C. MUELLER, L. KIRKPATRICK, & L. RICHTER, EVIDENCE § 5.31 (6th ed. 2018) (noting
there are two common forms of marital privilege). The testimonial privilege gives a witness a right
to refuse to testify against their spouse in criminal proceedings and, in some states, empowers
someone charged with a crime from preventing their spouse from testifying against them. Id. The
confidences privilege (also called marital communications privilege) allows witnesses to refuse to
reveal their own confidential marital communications and to prevent their spouses from doing so.
Id.
145
See United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1221-22 (9th Cir.1999).
137
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prosecutor attempted to evade spousal privilege by asking the defendant during cross-examination why his wife would have made these statements to
investigators and whether she was lying.146 The opinion noted that “[i]t is
improper ‘under the guise of ‘artful cross-examination’ to tell the jury the
testimony of otherwise inadmissible evidence.’”147 The court ended with a
colorful comment, noting that “‘while prosecutors are not required to describe sinners as saints, they are required to establish the state of sin by admissible evidence unaided by aspersions that rest on inadmissible evidence,
hunch or spite.’”148 By pursuing this line of cross-examination, the prosecutor essentially undermined the protections of spousal privilege.149
A variation of this problem emerged during the Rittenhouse trial and
partially formed the basis for the defense’s request for a mistrial.150 Prior to
the trial, prosecutors sought to introduce evidence of a video taken fifteen
days before the shooting on which Rittenhouse commented that he wished
he had his rifle to shoot several men he suspected as shoplifters.151 The prosecutors believed that this showed his mindset as “a teenage vigilante, involving himself in things that [did not] concern him.”152 The judge indicated that
he was not inclined to allow this evidence, but suggested he might reassess
his opinion at trial.153 The probative value of such evidence is arguably substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, which the Federal Rules of
Evidence preclude.
The prosecutor, rather than raising the issue outside of the presence
of the jury, peppered the defendant on cross-examination with questions
about whether it was acceptable to use deadly force to protect one’s personal
property.154 When confronted, the prosecutor argued that the judge had left
146

See id. at 1221.
See id. at 1222 (quoting United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 1993)).
148
See id. (quoting United States v. Schindler, 614 F.2d 227, 228 (9th Cir. 1980)).
149
See id. One of the specifically problematic questions the prosecutor asked the defendant
on the stand was “Now, you know your wife can’t be made to testify against you, don’t you?” Id.
at 1221. The court expressed two concerns about this. First, it allowed a question without a demonstration that the defendant’s spouse made such a statement and that it was accurate. Id. at 1222.
Second, it permitted the jury to draw an adverse inference that because the privilege had been
claimed, they could assume had the wife testified it would not be favorable to the defendant. Id.
The court expressed concern this practice would allow the marital privilege to be undermined by
giving the prosecution an unfair advantage. Id.
150
See Todd Richmond & Corey Williams, Explainer: Prosecutor’s Questions to Rittenhouse
Anger
Judge,
ABC
NEWS
(Nov.
10,
2021,
9:10
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/prosecutors-questions-rittenhouse-draw-judges-anger81096096.
151
See id.
152
See id.
153
See id.
154
See id.
147
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the door open to this line of questioning in his earlier ruling, to which the
judge responded, “For me! Not for you!”155 The judge’s anger here is not
surprising, as the prosecutor clearly referenced evidence that the judge had
previously excluded.
B.

Invading the Province of the Jury

Over the years, I have seen attorneys ask one witness if they believe
another witness is lying after conflicting testimony. While it is appropriate
to explore whether one witness has motive to fabricate testimony,156 it is not
appropriate to ask a witness during cross-examination to comment on the
truthfulness of another witness.157 Allowing the witness to do so invades the
province the jury in determining the credibility of witnesses.158 There is a
clear difference between establishing that one witness has different testimony from another and asking a witness if another witness is “[l]ying, making up or inventing” testimony.”159 The latter moves beyond highlighting a
difference in testimony and instead puts the witness in the position of the
jury in determining whether another witness has engaged in deliberate or
intentional falsehoods.160
When witnesses comment on each other’s credibility, it facilitates
improperly reductionist arguments at trial.161 For example, when a prosecutor asks a defendant whether an investigative officer is lying and the defendant answers in the affirmative, the prosecutor can then suggest that, if the
155

Richmond, supra note 150.
See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 466 (3d ed. 2012)
(alleging that a witness has a motive to fabricate falls within the realm of impeachment of a witness
by establishing bias). “Bias is a catchall term describing attitudes, feelings or emotions of a witness
that might affect her testimony, leading her to be more or less favorable to the position of a party
for reasons other than the merits.” Id.
157
See United States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2015) (first citing
United States v. Harrison, 585 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009); then citing United States v. Combs,
379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 2004); and then citing United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 121920 (9th Cir. 1999)).
158
See Alcantara-Castillo, 788 F.3d at 1191.
159
See id. at 1193.
160
See id. It is also worth noting that this principle echoes the evidentiary rule that witnesses
cannot speculate through their testimony and must have personal knowledge of facts in order to
testify about them. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
161
See Austin Cline, Oversimplification and Exaggeration Fallacies, THOUGHTCO. (May 29,
2021), https://www.thoughtco.com/oversimplification-and-exaggeration-fallacies-3968441. Oversimplification and exaggeration occur when actual causes of an event are reduced or multiplied to
the point where connections between causes and effects are blurred or buried. Id. In other words,
multiple causes are reduced to just one or a few (oversimplification), or a couple of causes are
multiplied into many (exaggeration). Id. Also known as the ‘reductive fallacy,’ oversimplification
is common.” Id.
156
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officer is telling the truth, then the defendant must be lying and his guilt has
been established.162 This kind of argument can mislead the jury or misstate
the evidence by pitting the defendant against the law enforcement officer.163
The fundamental question of a criminal trial is whether the defendant committed a crime, and it is “patently misleading to argue that the resolution of
this issue hinges upon the veracity of the [law enforcement witnesses.]”164
The problems created by this line of questioning highlight the overall risk
discussed in this article—moving a trial away from an analysis of the actual
evidence and focusing instead on theatrics and emotion. When a prosecutor
argues that acquitting the defendant is tantamount to a finding that the officer
lied under oath, they make a wholly impermissible argument. In that case, a
jury could disregard the principle of reasonable doubt because they do not
want to call an officer a liar.
Cross-examination can also invade the province of the jury by assuming the ultimate conclusion of the case. For example, if a character witness offers testimony that a criminal defendant charged with drug dealing
has a reputation for being honest and truthful, it is impermissible to ask that
witness if their opinion would change if they knew the defendant was distributing drugs.165 This is because an opinion of a witness that is elicited by
a question that assumes the central and ultimate issue of the case has limited
probative value.166
One of the more controversial pretrial rulings in the Rittenhouse case
was an order by the judge requiring that the individuals who were shot be
identified through terms such as “complaining witness” or “decedent” rather
than “victims.”167 The justification for this ruling is rooted in what was discussed earlier in this article—the use of the term “victim” presupposes a legal conclusion, namely that the person was victimized by criminal action.
After all, the word “victim” is defined as, “a person harmed by a crime, tort,
or other wrong.”168 This kind of pretrial motion is often common in cases
where the contested issue is whether the defendant’s conduct rises to a crime
162

See United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding prosecutor improperly suggested the resolution of the case hinged on the veracity of FBI agents rather than
whether the defendant was guilty of the offenses charged).
163
See id. at 209.
164
Id.
165
See United States v. Mason, 993 F.2d 406, 407-08 (4th Cir. 1993) (condemning use of
“guilt-assuming hypothetical questions asked of law character witnesses”).
166
See id. at 409.
167
See Becky Sullivan, Prosecutors Cannot Call Those Shot by Kyle Rittenhouse ‘victims.’
But
‘Looters’
is
OK,
NPR
(Oct.
26,
2021,
7:02
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/10/26/1049458617/kyle-rittenhouse-victims-arsonists-looters-judgeruled.
168
See Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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(as opposed to a trial where everyone agrees a crime has occurred and is
instead focused on the identity of the perpetrator). The motion usually prohibits law enforcement witnesses from referring to an individual as a victim,
though it should be noted that a prosecutor is often permitted to use the term
in closing arguments because, at closing, they assert that the crime has been
committed.
As illustrated throughout this section, allowing an officer to call
someone a victim is tantamount to that witness concluding that a crime occurred, which is within the province of the jury. Moreover, the term is considered highly prejudicial when the defendant raises a defense of self-defense.169 When someone is referred to as a “victim,” it is implied that the
person was wronged by someone else. Allowing witnesses to plant that image in the minds of a jury encourages the conclusion that the defendant
wronged that person. In a self-defense case, that subtle messaging unfairly
undermines the defense while bolstering the prosecution’s theory of the case.
The judge’s decision to bar the use of the word “victim” drew widespread coverage and outrage.170 It is possible that some of this outrage came
from a perception that the ruling was slanted, as defense attorneys were permitted to call the men who were shot “looters” and “rioters” if there was
evidence to establish that they had engaged in that activity that night.171
While this appears to create a double standard, it should be noted that calling
an individual a “victim” presupposes the occurrence of a crime, which only
the jury is entitled to conclude. On the other hand, calling an individual a
“looter” or “rioter” does not relate to the ultimate issue that must be determined by the jury.
C.

Comments on a Defendant’s Right to Remain Silent

The foundation for the Court’s landmark Miranda decision was established years earlier in Escobedo v. Illinois.172 This case addressed a criminal defendant’s rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel during a custodial interrogation following an arrest.173 In its decision, the Court
expressly noted its skepticism regarding law enforcement’s reliance on confessions and its ability to undermine these constitutional protections:

169
See Julie Bosman & Dan Hinkel, Before Kyle Rittenhouse’s Murder Trial, a Debate Over
Terms Like ‘Victim’, NY TIMES (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/27/us/kylerittenhouse-trial-victims.html.
170
See id.
171
See id.
172
See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
173
See id. at 490-91.
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We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern,
that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to
depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation.174
Two years later, these principles were bolstered in Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court addressed the problem of “official overbearing.” Official overbearing occurs when law enforcement takes advantage of a suspect
to get the individual to confess to a crime. Such conduct “undermines a defendant’s constitutional rights by compelling him “to be a witness against
himself.”175 To combat these concerns, the Court held that the prosecution
cannot use statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of “procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.”176 This ruling gave rise to the nowfamous Miranda warning, which advises a suspect in police custody of the
right to remain silent, that any statement made can be used against the suspect, that they have a right to the presence of an attorney during questioning,
and that if they can’t afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them.177
Following Miranda, a circuit split developed regarding whether a
prosecutor could cross-examine a defendant about his choice to remain silent
during a police interrogation.178 The Court first addressed this split in United
States v. Hale, ruling that the probative value of pretrial, custodial silence
following a Miranda warning is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.179
While the Court acknowledged that persistent silence in the face of an accusation of wrongdoing has some probative value, it noted that a suspect’s decision to remain silent during the emotional and confusing circumstances
following an arrest could be informed by many reasons. Where a person has
been advised of their right to remain silent, their doing so may be indicative
of a decision to rely on such a right and would “support an inference that the
explanatory testimony was a later fabrication.”180
The Court expanded on these principles one year later in Doyle v.
Ohio.181 Here, the Court acknowledged that silence at the time of arrest may
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 488-89.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
Id. at 444.
See id.
See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 173 (1975).
See id.
See id. at 176-77.
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616 (1976).
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suggest that the suspect’s story was fabricated to “fit within the seams of the
State’s case as it was developed at pretrial hearings.”182 The Court concluded
that because the state was now required to provide advisement of the right to
remain silent, every post-arrest silence is “insolubly ambiguous[.]”183 And
while the Miranda warning does not contain an express assurance that silence will be used against the suspect, the assurance is implicit in the warning
such that “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process
to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial.”184
Notably, the Court refused to extend this protection to pre-arrest silence in Jenkins v. Anderson.185 In Jenkins, the defendant claimed self-defense after killing someone during a knife fight and fleeing the scene of the
crime without informing police of what happened186 The prosecution in closing argument noted that the defendant had waited at least two weeks before
reporting the stabbing to anyone.187 The defendant later appealed his conviction, arguing that his prearrest silence could not be used against him as it
violated his Fifth Amendment rights.188 In its opinion, the Court looked to
the evidentiary rationale that a witness could be impeached by their failure
to state a fact in circumstances where it would naturally have been asserted.189 The Court distinguished this prearrest silence from that which was
at issue in Doyle v. Ohio, where defendant had been advised of his right to
remain silent by law enforcement.190 Here, the Court noted that because no
government actor had taken action that might have induced the defendant’s
decision to remain silent, there was no constitutional violation embedded in
the state making evidentiary use of that silence.191
This position was strengthened two years later in Fletcher v. Weir,
when the Court affirmed that the provisions of the Miranda warning, rather
than the arrest itself, activates the prohibition on the prosecution commenting
on the defendant’s silence.192 Therefore, if police arrest a defendant but fail
to give Miranda warnings, and the person subsequently testifies at trial, the
prosecution can legitimately cross-examine them on their decision to
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id.
See id. at 617.
See id. at 618.
See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1980).
See id. at 233.
See id. at 234.
See id. at 232.
See id. at 239.
See Doyle, 426 U.S 610 (1976).
See id. at 240.
See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982).
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withhold their version of the incident from police when arrested. It is important to note that while Miranda prevents the prosecution from using a
defendant’s unwarned incriminating statements in its case in chief, the government may use statements made by a defendant in violation of Miranda
during cross-examination.193
This line of cases could create a bizarre incentive structure for law
enforcement officers tasked with giving suspects Miranda warnings prior to
eliciting confessions. Escobedo highlighted that society should not value a
criminal justice system that emphasizes confessions over independent investigation, and this is part of why the right to remain silent is an important
right.194 Miranda offered protection of this right by requiring that whenever
law enforcement questions a suspect in custody, they must provide certain
procedural warnings of the suspect’s rights. Under Hale and Doyle, the prosecution loses the ability to question the suspect at trial about the decision to
remain silent after he has been properly Mirandized.
From a game-theory perspective,195 a law enforcement officer is incentivized to make an educated guess about whether a given suspect is likely
to answer questions once read their rights. If the suspect is likely to do so,
then the warning should be given, so the statements are admissible. But, if
the suspect is likely to say something about the crime without making inculpatory admissions, the police have an incentive under Fletcher v. Weir to not
Mirandize the defendant before questioning him. The defendant is then in a
trap where either the decision to answer the question or the decision to remain silent can be used against him. If he answers the un-Mirandized questions and subsequently testifies, the prosecution may cross-examine and impeach him on any inconsistencies. If he remains silent, on the other hand,
the prosecution may impeach him using the fact that he told the story for the
first time at trial.
In the Rittenhouse case, an allegation that the prosecutor commented
on the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent following his arrest
formed the basis of the defendant’s request for a mistrial.196 In its crossexamination of Rittenhouse, the prosecution attempted to show the defendant was entirely honest on the stand and had tailored his testimony over the
193

See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964)..
195
“Game theory is a set of tools and a language for describing and predicting strategic behavior.” Randal C. Picker, “An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law” (Coase-Sandor Institute
for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 22, 1994). Game theory posits that rational actors need
to worry about the actions of others and utilizes that interdependence to make strategic choices. Id.
196
See Amy Forliti & Scott Bauer, EXPLAINER: What’s Behind Rittenhouse Mistrial Requests?, AP NEWS (Nov. 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/kyle-rittenhouse-trial-judge-directed-verdict-788879e4deb6d4639adab573ee3ff753.
194

GIVE 'EM THE OL' RAZZLE DAZZLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

234

7/11/22 9:23 AM

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXVII

course of the last year.197 The defense objected, arguing that this line of
questioning amounted to a comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent.198 The judge warned the prosecutor that he was “right on the borderline” and that it would be, “a grave constitutional violation for [him] to talk
about a defendant’s silence[.]”199 Despite this warning, the judge again had
to admonish the prosecutor for engaging in a similar line of questioning.200
The judge’s anger towards the prosecution highlights how serious this issue
is. Because judges do not want to punish a defendant for exercising their
right to remain silent, prosecutors should simply avoid mentioning any conduct that draws the jury’s attention to the fact that a particular defendant did
not speak to law enforcement after being arrested.
VI. CLOSING
Closing arguments represent the final opportunity for each side to
address the jury before it renders judgment on the case. Since it is critical to
take advantage of this opportunity to persuade the jury, it becomes tempting
to blur the ethical lines through an improperly theatrical closing. This section will return to an examination of improper rhetoric—including the use of
religious, moral, or other inflammatory language. This section will also address limitations on attacking the other side of the case—both counsel and
their witnesses—when an attorney attempts to persuade the jury that it
should side with their legal argument.
A.

Use of Religious, Moral, and Other Inflammatory Rhetoric

It is hard to imagine a party winning a trial without making a closing
argument. A persuasive closing argument may help a litigator recover when
previous phases of the trial have gone poorly. Closing arguments are also
critical because empirical studies show they are easier for juries to remember
than trial testimony.201
An effective closing argument must be persuasive. Aristotle argued
that there were three primary methods of persuasion—ethos (an ethical
197
See Libby Emmons, BREAKING: Judge Slams Prosecutors For Trying to Use Rittenhouse’s Right to Remain Silent Against Him, POST MILLENNIAL (Nov. 10, 2021), https://thepostmillennial.com/judge-slams-prosecutors-for-trying-to-use-rittenhouses-right-to-remain-silentagainst-him.
198
See id.
199
Id.
200
See id.
201
See FREDERIC G. LEVIN, MIKE PAPANTONIO, & MARTIN LEVIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS:
THE LAST BATTLE 4 (1st ed. 2003).
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appeal or appeal based on credibility), logos (a logical argument), and pathos
(an emotional argument).202 Many of the legal rules which have been discussed in this article could be viewed as favoring logos, as they emphasize
that courtroom decisions must be made on the basis of the evidence educed
at trial.203 “It is the hallmark of a fair and civilized justice system that verdicts be based on reason, not emotion, revenge, or even sympathy.”204 But,
as Aristotle noted, the power of emotion as a tool of persuasion primes this
as an area of potential conflict. The attorney who hopes to prevail is often
tempted to produce a theatrical display aimed at triggering an emotional response in the jury, which may overshadow the evidence and governing law.
If we value the idea that verdicts are based on evidence rather than
emotion, lines must be drawn regarding the language used to distinguish between rhetorical flourish and impermissible emotional appeals. For instance,
religious and moral rhetoric specifically appeal to passion and prejudice rather than reason and the law.205 Concern about the use of religious imagery
in arguments is reflected in United States v. Giry, where the First Circuit
considered whether statements made by the prosecutor prejudicially inflamed the jury.206 The prosecutor’s “most egregious comment” was that the
defendant’s denial of the specific intent to import cocaine, “[s]ounds like
Peter who for the third time denied Christ[.]”207 The court ruled that this
constituted an irrelevant and inflammatory appeal to the jurors’ private religious beliefs and “[s]uch comments warrant special condemnation when uttered by the government’s attorney, whose duty is as much ‘to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.’”208 While ultimately finding the
trial judge gave a sufficiently strong curative instruction to solve the problem, the court called this statement “deliberate,” “wholly unprovoked,” and

202
See Krista C. McCormack, Ethos, Pathos, and Logos: The Benefits of Aristotelian Rhetoric
in the Courtroom, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 131, 132 (2014).
203
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (noting evidence can be relevant,
but still be inadmissible because it has the tendency to “lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a
ground different from proof specific to the offense charged[,]” including an emotional basis).
204
Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1015 (10th Cir. 2002).
205
See Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1020 (11th Cir. 1991) (identifying as outrageous
comments by a prosecutor which included, “numerous appeals to religious symbols and beliefs, at
one point even drawing an analogy to Judas Iscariot.”)
206
See United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 132-34 (1st Cir. 1987).
207
See Giry, 818 F.2d at 132. The Bible relays different accounts of Peter, a disciple of Christ,
denying knowing him on three different occasions when questioned by authorities, following
Christ’s arrest. Matthew 26:33-35, Mark 14:29-31, Luke 22:33-34, and John 18:15-27.
208
See Giry, 818 F.2d at 133 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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of such “complete irrelevance” that “its sole purpose was to inflame the
jury’s passions.”209
It should be noted that, similar to prohibitions on religious appeals,
the Supreme Court has found it improper to use language that dehumanizes
the other side.210 There is an additional prohibition on imposing certain
moral imperatives on a jury in criminal cases. While it is not per se improper
for a prosecutor to ask the jury to act as the conscience of the community, it
becomes improper to ask the jury to convict the defendant in order “to protect
community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking.”211
In the civil context, wrongful death cases are easy targets for an
overly emotional closing argument by the plaintiff’s attorney.212 In Draper
v. Airco, Inc., the Third Circuit found that while the family of the victim was
“entitled to have someone speak with eloquence and compassion for their
cause[,]” a plea of pure passion must be restrained to preclude a blatant appeal to bias and prejudice. 213 The court specifically noted that the ethics
rules and constraints from case law protect against this danger.214 Plaintiff’s
counsel in Draper committed many of the errors which have been discussed
in this article, including asserting his own personal opinion as to the justness
of a client’s cause, referring to facts not in evidence, and, as will be discussed, making “several prejudicial, vituperative and insulting references to
opposing counsel.”215 The court ultimately cited the attorney’s inflammatory
and prejudicial rhetoric as the basis for overturning the judgement in his client’s favor.216 In remanding the matter for a new trial, the court reasoned
that the closing argument of the plaintiff “was so constantly and effectively
addressed to the prejudices of the jury” that a new trial was necessary.217
B.

Attacking the Other Side

When witnesses offer conflicting testimony, an attorney must convince the jury that they should credit the testimony of the witnesses who
209

See id. at 134.
See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 (1986) (condemning a closing argument
where the prosecutor used the word “animal” and made, “several comments reflecting an emotional
reaction to the case.”
211
See United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1151, 1153 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Henderson v. United States,
218 F.2d 14, 19-20 (6th Cir. 1955).
212
See Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1978).
213
See id. at 95.
214
See id.
215
See id.
216
See id.
217
See Draper, 580 F.2d at 96-97.
210
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support their side and disregard the testimony of opposing witnesses. Attorneys are given reasonable latitude in fashioning closing arguments, including
making reasonable inferences based on the evidence.218 Where a case “essentially reduces to which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that one of the two sides is lying.”219 However, as a general rule, evidence of personal character or a character trait is
not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the witness acted in
accordance with that character.220 While there are specific means of impeaching a witness such as offering evidence of their reputation for truthfulness,221 bias,222 or relevant prior convictions,223 an attorney does not have the
right to make a general attack on a witness’s character.224
The Rittenhouse case demonstrated the fine line an attorney must
observe in cross-examining a witness for perceived bias.225 Here, the prosecutor sought to impeach Drew Hernandez, a journalist who had recorded
video of one of the fatal shootings, by demonstrating bias based on the fact
that his employer was a platform for far-right political views.226 The prosecutor was permitted to show that, minutes after posting the video on Twitter,
the witness had tweeted a comment noting that, in his view, the shooting by
Rittenhouse was a measure taken by an armed citizen defending a car dealership.227 This strategy of cross examination demonstrated the witness’s bias
in that he appeared to be operating from a perspective that Mr. Rittenhouse
was justified in his conduct. The witness’s predisposition for Mr. Rittenhouse’s actions is something the jury would need to know to evaluate the
strength of this testimony. However, when the prosecutor attempted to ask
about the political orientation of the witness’s employer, the judge refused
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See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991).
See id.
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See FED. R. EVID. 404
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See FED. R. EVID. 608
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See Kirkpatrick, supra note 156.
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See FED R. EVID. 609
224
See United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996) (outlining five acceptable methods of attacking the credibility of a witness’s testimony). The five methods are as
follows: 1) attacking their character for truthfulness; 2) demonstrating that prior to trial the witness
made statements inconsistent with their testimony; 3) showing the witness is biased; 4) showing a
default in capacity to perceive, recall or relate the event about which they are testifying; and 5)
contradicting the substance of the witness’s testimony. Id. (citing GOLD, 27 FED. PRAC. & PROC.
EVID. § 6094 (2d ed.)).
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See Robert Mackey, Rittenhouse Trial Judge Blocks Prosecutor From Asking if Far-Right
Videographer is Biased, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2021), https://theintercept.com/2021/11/11/rittenhouse-trial-judge-blocks-prosecutor-asking-far-right-videographer-biased/.
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to allow it saying “this is not a political trial.”228 The judge’s refusal demonstrates the distinction between cross-examining a witness for bias and attempting to bring out a fact about the witness, such as their political affiliation, that may taint how certain jurors view them.
When litigating a case, it is also critical that attorneys maintain their
professionalism. The Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct notes
that “[a] lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those
who serve it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials.”229 This
value of professionalism, embedded in ethical rules, is also reinforced by
case law. The prohibition on personal attacks “is but a part of the larger duty
of counsel to avoid acrimony in relations with opposing counsel during trial
and confine argument to record evidence. It is firmly established that the
lawyer should abstain from any allusion to the personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel.”230
An overly theatrical approach to litigation emerges when lawyers
turn the focus to themselves and make derogatory comments about each
other. For example, in United States v. Young,231 the defense attorney in closing argued that his client had been unfairly prosecuted; that throughout the
trial, the prosecutor had poisoned the jurors’ minds against his client unfairly; that the prosecutor had behaved reprehensibly; and no one in the
courtroom, including the prosecutor, believed that his client intended to defraud anyone.232 The appeal focused on the prosecutor’s comment regarding
his own belief in the defendant’s guilt during his rebuttal closing.233 While
acknowledging this point, the Court noted it is incumbent on all attorneys to
confine their arguments within proper bounds and that the defense attorney
was also prohibited from interjecting his personal beliefs into the presentation.234 The Court took particular issue with the defense attorney’s “unfounded and inflammatory attacks” on the opposing side, writing, “[t]he kind
of advocacy shown by this record has no place in the administration of justice
and should neither be permitted nor rewarded[.]”235 The Court recognized a
trial doesn’t always follow a script and, occasionally, in the heat of the moment problematic remarks are made.236 This case nevertheless highlights the
228
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United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (internal citations omitted).
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See id. at 4.
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See id. at 6.
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See Young, 470 U.S. at 8 (citing Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952)).
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See id. at 9.
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See id. at 10 (first citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976); and then citing
Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897)).
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importance of litigators acting professionally at all time and not making their
battle a personal crusade against the integrity or character of opposing counsel.
VII. CONCLUSION
Litigators are naturally competitive people who want their own side
to prevail in the courtroom. This may arise out of a mere desire to win or a
desire to improve their public perception as attorneys. Many, if not most,
attorneys, also believe in the cause they are advancing in the courtroom.
Each of these impulses creates a drive to win, and to prevail, an attorney
must convince a jury of twelve laypeople that their side is the right one, and
that the jury should care enough about the correctness of this position to deliver a verdict for their client. This creates an inherent theatrical setting for
trials and, in an effort to win over the jury, the lawyer often becomes the
actor who wants to put on the performance of a lifetime. On the other side
of this equation is a judicial system that seeks the truth. That quest for truth
requires the jury to remain focused on the evidence before it and to make
reasoned and logical judgments from that evidence, rather than falling prey
to overly emotional appeals, prejudice, and bias.
This article has highlighted the dangers that emerge at each stage of
a trial when the proceeding becomes overly theatrical. As has been shown,
this typically occurs when the focus of the attorneys and the jury shifts from
the evidence itself to the performance and conduct of the attorneys. Guardrails—both ethical and constitutional—exist at each of these phases to prevent such theatrics; but these safeguards are only effective to the extent they
are known, respected, and strictly enforced by the court. A trial attorney’s
performance will naturally contain theatrical elements due to the inherent
role that emotion plays in persuasion. But understanding the limits of emotive advocacy allows an attorney to maintain their ability to persuade others,
while upholding the integrity of a system that aims to discover the truth.

